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simply because some sharp edged cutting tools, such as butcher
knives, were used in the kitchen.
While the law is clear that an employer who has paid workmen's compensation to his employee is entitled to a statutory
lien49 upon any judgment which the employee might recover on
account of the injury, the action which the employer may take
to protect his lien is not so clear. This uncertainty was alleviated
to some extent when the Appellate Court for the First District,
in the case of Sjoberg v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 50 determined that
an employer had the right to intervene in a proceeding instituted
by his employee against a third party tortfeasor but that such
intervention did not include the right to participate in the conduct
or trial of the suit. Another interesting procedural question
was involved in the case of A. C. F. Industries, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission,51 where the first order of the commission had been
reversed by the Circuit Court of Cook County and the case sent
back to the commission. Review of the second order of the
commission was then sought in the Superior Court of Cook
County. The Supreme Court there concluded that orderly judicial
procedure demanded that a second review of the same proceeding
should be obtained in the same court in which the first review
was had.
II.

CONTRACTS

Although no new precedents appear to have been established
in the field of contracts during the preceding year, the case of
Pure Milk Association v. Kraft Foods Company1 embodies an
unusual application of the law relating to assignments. The
plaintiff therein, a marketing association, had agreements with
various dairy farmers to market their milk through the association which agreements provided that the association might author49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5.

508 Ili. App. (2d) 414, 132 N. E. (2d) 56 (1956), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT L&w
REvTEw 269, and 56 Columbia L. R. 1241.

518 Ill. (2d) 552, 134 N. E. (2d) 764 (1956).
18 Il1. App. (2d) 102, 130 N. E. (2d) 765 (1955).
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ize the purchaser of the milk to remit the dues of the members
directly to the association. In the alternative, the association
was empowered to collect the full amount due to each member
from the purchaser and pay over to the member the sum received
less any amount which the member might owe the association.
The defendant, a purchaser of the milk, refused to abide by the
first-mentioned provision and the plaintiff thereupon notified the
defendant that it elected to collect the entire amount due to its
members. When the contract came before the Appellate Court
for the Second District, it held the latter provision valid, but the
former was thought to be unenforcible because it amounted to
a partial assignment which could be enforced in equity only if
both assignor and assignee were joined.
Doctrines having bearing on the law relating to specialized
types of contracts, 2 or quasi-contractual obligations, are discussed
separately hereafter under appropriate classifications.
INSURANCE

A result that appears to be unique in the annals of Illinois
law was reached by the Appellate Court for the Third District
in the case of Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Insurance Company,3 a suit to recover on an insurance policy providing benefits
for accidental death. It seems that the deceased and two other
men conspired to burn a building belonging to one of the conspirators to collect the insurance thereon. After spreading gasoline on the floors of the building, they withdrew but the deceased
re-entered to obtain some bed spreads for himself. The fire started
prematurely from unknown causes and the deceased was trapped
in the building. The defendant's plea to the effect that death was
caused by non-accidental means, namely, the criminal conspiracy,
fell upon deaf ears, and the plaintiff was allowed to recover on
2 No cases of consequence relating to bills and notes or contracts for the sale of
personal property were determined during the survey period.
39 Ill. App. (2d) 330, 132 N. E. (2d) 579 (1956), noted in 2 Villanova L. R. 133.
Hibbs, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
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the ground that the premature start of the fire and not the
criminal act caused the death of the insured.
A somewhat unusual situation was presented to the Appellate
Court for the Third District in the case of Krutsinger v. Illinois
Casualty Company.4 The plaintiffs therein, having recovered a
judgment against the defendant's insured, sought to enforce said
judgment against the defendant. The insurance policy contained
the usual provision to the effect that the insurer shall have the
exclusive right to defend suits and negotiate settlements. Because
of the present defendant's inaction, the insured had undertaken
the defense of the original suit and had participated in settlements negotiated by other insurers. The court, however, held
that the provision in question could not be asserted to deny
liability where the insurer had had every opportunity to exercise
the rights there given and any disadvantage it suffered was due
to its own inaction.
In the case of Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company v.
Richards,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit concluded that an insurance agency which procures insurance under the assigned risk plan" does not become the agent
of the insurer to whom the risk is ultimately assigned. Hence,
the doctrine that the principle is charged with the knowledge of
his agent was held inapplicable to such a situation.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

Two cases within the year possess a degree of interest with
reference to doctrines in that field of law devoted to implied
promises, both of which reflected upon the rights and duties existing between principals and their agents or brokers. In one case,
that of Kantoff v. Sedlak Motor Sales, Inc.,7 an insurance broker
who had acted as agent for the insured in placing a substantial life
10 Ill. App. (2d) 344, 135 N. E. (2d) 180 (1956).
5229 F. (2d) 210 (1956).
6 Iii. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 58m.
78 Ill. App. (2d) 8, 130 N. E. (2d) 289 (1955). Leave to appeal has been denied.
4
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insurance policy sued to recover the amount he had advanced on
behalf of the insured by way of payment for the initial premium.
Finding that the insured, who had not requested the agent to make
such payment,' had nevertheless ratified the act by retaining the
policy, hence had received a benefit, the court then proceeded to
the question of the measure of recovery. The trial court gave
judgment for the amount advanced less the sum of the commission
paid the plaintiff by the insurer but the Appellate Court for the
First District reversed when it held that the broker was entitled
to complete reimbursement without deduction. It was enabled to
reach that determination by recourse to the holding of the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of O'Reilly v. Miller.'
The second of the cases, that of Schloz v. Clements, ° dealt
with an endeavor on the part of a purchaser of real property to
recover, from the seller's broker, the amount of a down payment
on the purchase price following the purchaser's election to renounce the express agreement with the seller because of the latter's
inability to make prompt delivery of a merchantable title. While,
under the contract, the amount of the down payment would have
eventually gone to the seller, or be used for the seller's credit, the
facts disclosed that the fund had been received, and held, by the
defendant broker until a short time after notice of revocation, at
which time it had been distributed principally toward the satisfaction of the broker's claim for commissions. The theory of the
action became tangled because assertions had been made that
fraud and misrepresentation had been practiced on the purchaser
by the broker. In addition, it appeared that the express contract
between the seller and the buyer still remained in existence."
For these reasons, the Appellate Court for the Second District
reversed a judgment which had ordered the broker to repay the
8 A benefit voluntarily conferred without request would ordinarily not give rise
to an implied in law promise to reimburse for the worth of such benefit: Volt
Rubber Co. v. Peoria Coca Cola Bottling Co., 280 Ill. App. 14 (1935).
9 148 Wash. 277, 268 P. 869 (1928).
10 7 Ill. App. (2d)

510, 130 N. E. (2d)

1 (19,55).

11 Where the entire relationship between the parties is covered by an express
contract, there is little opportunity in law for the creation of an implied promise:
Walker v. Brown, 28 Ill. 378 (1862).
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purchaser for so much of the down payment as remained in the
broker's hands, the court saying that plaintiff's claim, if any
should have been directed against the seller rather than against
the seller's broker.
If the original theory of the case had been carried out, it is
doubtful that the result there achieved would have been proper for
protection against suit is not accorded to one who has received
money on behalf of another who is not entitled thereto 2 unless
the agent-recipient can show that, prior to demand, he had paid
the money over to his principal so that it could be said the agent
had received no benefit therefrom."3 A mere giving of credit to
the principal for the money so received, without any change of
position, would not be sufficient in law to defeat an implied contract on the agent's part to make reimbursement for the money
paid to him.14
SURETYSHIP

Difficulties arising in the application of doctrines of suretyship law were made apparent through the medium of four recent
cases, two of which dealt with questions as to whether or not a
suretyship relationship existed between the parties and two with
the scope or extent of the obligation which had been entered into.
The defendants in the case of Werner v. Steele,"' seeking the benefit
of the doctrine that a surety is discharged in the event an extension of time has been granted the principal debtor without obtaining the surety's consent thereto, 6 were faced with a provision in
the note in question to the effect that all signers were "principals"
and, as such, had agreed that no extension of time should operate
to release any of the parties from their obligation to make payment. By invoking the familiar parole evidence rule, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District was able to say the several
12 Smith v. Bender, 75 I1. 492 (1874); Wheeler v. Cannon, 84 Ill. App. 591
(1899).
13 Winslow v. Anderson, 78 N. H. 478, 102 A. 310, L. R. A. 1918C 173 (1917).
14 Buller v. Harrison, 2 Cowp. 565, 98 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1777).

15 8 Ill. App. (2d) 460, 131 N. E. (2d) 820 (1956).
16 Myers v. First National Bank of Fairbury, 78 111.257 (1875).
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signers could not be permitted to contradict their status in relation to the noteholder although it did recognize that, as between
the several signers, the provision would not be conclusive.17
By way of contrast, in the case of Zapalski v. Underwriters
8 the dispute was
at Lloyd's, London,"
one as to whether or not the
plaintiffs were persons entitled to have the benefit of the surety's
obligation under a fidelity bond designed to insure against the misapplication of money paid to building contractors who were members of the association which had given the bond as primary
obligor. The plaintiffs, asserting they had paid money to a defaulting contractor who was a member of the association in question, were met with the defense that, at the time the money had
been handed over and apparently up until the time the greater
portion of the funds had been misappropriated, the builder had
not yet joined the association, hence was not one whose fidelity
had been guaranteed in this fashion. Since the bond was not
conditioned to limit liability to only those funds paid to the builder
after he had become a member of the association, the Appellate
Court for the First District was able to construe the ambiguity
in the instrument to the disadvantage of the compensated surety
and thereby reach the conclusion that the plaintiffs were members
of the class covered by the bond.
The extent of the surety's liability upon a bond given to support the issuance of an injunction writ 9 became the focal point
in the case of United Mail Order, Warehouse & Retail Employees
Union, Local 20 v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.2 9 The bond there
concerned had stated a penal sum of $1,000 but the union had sued
for, and recovered, a judgment in a much larger sum on the theory
that it had sustained damages in excess of that amount from the
alleged wrongful issuance of the injunction. There being no cove17 McKee v. Gaulrapp, 367 11.
189

321, 11 N. E. (2d) 380 (1937).
Iil. App. (2d) 311, 132 N. E. (2d) 785 (1956). Leave to appeal has been

denied.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, §§ 8-9.
206 Ill. App. (2d) 477, 128 N. E. (2d) 645 (1955). The decision therein was
later affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court at a time subsequent to the period of
this survey: 9 Il1. (2d) 101, 137 N. E. (2d) 47 (1956). For other aspects of this
case, see Section I, Business Organizations, note 44.
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nant in the bond to pay the amount of all damage sustained, and
the measure of the liability having been specified at the penal sum
of $1,000, the Appellate Court for the First District rather quickly
concluded that the obligor could not be held, either in debt or in
assumpsit, for anything more than the penalty amount. In Davis
v. Moore," on the other hand, the obligee under an appeal bond
given in connection with a forcible entry and detainer suit2 2 was
permitted to bring suit to have the bond reformed to include a
covenant to pay the rent accruing during the pendency of the case,
and to then enforce such covenant, on the theory that all statutory
requirements concerning appeal bonds are parts of the bond
whether recited therein or not. A judgment in favor of the obligee
for the amount of the unpaid rent as well as for costs in relation
to the appeal was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES

Cases illustrating the structure of the judicial department of
the state, or the functions to be performed by judicial officials,
are relatively rare but could be of profound importance since it is
basic law that courts and judges may validly act only in their respective jurisdictional spheres.' In that connection, it had one
time been understood that Illinois courts were denied the right to
entertain jurisdiction over wrongful death cases involving nonresidents, based on deaths occurring outside the state, except in
those instances where a denial of jurisdictional power could result
in a denial of relief.2 That view had been exposed to a degree of
criticism as the result of the outcome of two earlier cases, one
arising under a comparable statute of a sister state3 and the other
217 Ill. App. (2d) 519, 130 N. E. (2d) 117 (1955).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 20.
1 An instance of the seldom used original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be found in the case of People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 Ill. (2d) 43, 132 N. E.

(2d) 507 (1956).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.

3 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1961), noted in
30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw

174.

